I feel partially responsible for all of this. In 2023, I wrote a glowing review of Ruben Amorim and his tactics used at Sporting Lisbon. I even provided my prediction that the Portuguese manager would soon be snapped up by one of Europe’s top clubs. Little did I know what was to happen next.
Ruben Amorim’s tactics, re-adapted for Manchester United, have drawn quite a bit of unwanted attention in recent months. But are they so bad, and why did a very similar approach work at Sporting? Who are the players that Amorim actually needs, and what is the likelihood that he’ll turn United’s fortunes around?
This is what I’m looking at today, while not trying to sugar-coat things, nor being overly pessimistic. Welcome to Amorimball Manchester!
Amorim’s Pre-managerial career
Ruben Amorim’s tactics used for Sporting Lisbon brought him to the radar of the world’s football elite. But it wasn’t just the results that were attention-grabbing, but the way in which he had entirely reshaped a club that seemed on the verge of disaster. You may still recall how several Sporting players terminated their contracts in 2018 after being attacked by supporters inside the team’s training facilities.
Before that, of course, Amorim had been a versatile midfielder. He acquired a strong reputation in Portugal, earning almost 100 appearances for Benfica Lisbon and securing 14 call-ups to the Portuguese national team, a notable achievement.
It was straight to the top as soon as Amorim became a manager. After gaining brief lower league experience, he was tasked with saving Braga. By the end of the 2019/20 season, the team had only lost two games.
This afforded an opportunity to manage Sporting, one of the big three clubs in Portugal. Amorim took over the club while it had been cast adrift and dealing with one of the biggest crises in its history.
He captured three Primeira Liga titles in five seasons, and famously destroyed Pep Guardiola’s Manchester City in a UCL game that was, effectively, his audition to join Manchester United.
Smooth sailing, until…
Football Philosophy
Rúben Amorim has been criticised recently for being a dogmatist. That’s not always been the case. In fact, Sporting was often a team willing to adapt to the opposition’s strengths.
Yes, Amorim has always favoured playing three men at the back. Typically, his teams line up in a 3-4-3 system where the wing-backs can also become additional defenders.
This means that the wing-backs tuck in and play behind the main attacker. At best, it allows the team to attack quickly and defend with an extra man in defence.
Typically, his teams defend from the front, and players engage in zonal marking, and possession is slow and deliberate. All of these things happen, of course, when everything is in working condition.
Many, including myself, will point to the fact that Manchester United didn’t have players who easily fit into Amorim’s system. Others, however, will defend him by reminding critics of how Amorim, essentially, built a new Sporting Lisbon side before achieving significant success.
What Did Rúben Amorim Bring to Manchester United?
The “three at the back” system that Amorim employs has become something of a modern obsession for Manchester United fans. I cannot blame them. However, I think that it’s the way in which Amorim has stayed consistent with his tactical plan outside of the formation that has looked the most troublesome.
Still, it is clear that Amorim believes he is building muscle memory. His plan is to create connections between players and to recruit the right type of players before United can be successful.
Modern clubs typically have their youth teams play in the same system as the senior side. Manchester United’s youth system tends to focus on 4-2-3-1 formations and developing individual players’ excellent technique. Amorim, fundamentally, is asking for a change.
Despite this, it should be noted that over the one-year period in charge, Amorim has overseen one of the poorest iterations of Manchester United that has ever been witnessed. “Good times,” he’s assured fans, are, however, on the way.
Rúben Amorim’s Manchester United in Defence
Let’s focus on the theory first, and then let me try to explain why the tactics have not yet worked.
Famously, Amorim stars in most games with three central defenders. Is he the only one to do so in the Premier League? No, Crystal Palace’s Oliver Glasner and Wolves’ Vitor Pereira do the same, while Brentford’s Scott Parker sets up his team in a 5-4-1 with quick wing-backs.
Amorim’s 3-4-2-1 formation generally resembles a 3-5-2 for a 4-4-2 formation when defending. Casemiro (or Manuel Ugarte) typically join up with the three central defenders.
In terms of pressing, Amorim’s United doesn’t do anything too wild either. Attackers will press the opposition aggressively when they try to build up from the back. If the ball is not won back, the team will retreat to a mid-block and employ zonal marking. As we saw recently, long balls played over defenders can put players like Harry Maguire in a difficult position.
Defenders will press, but only use specific triggers. The wide central defenders, usually Luke Shaw and Lenny Yoro, will move with the attacker if he tries to retreat and play between the lines.
Technically, this means that the two wing-backs, often Patrick Dorgu and Diogo Dalot, should drop down and ensure that United always has an extra man in defence and that if the opposition moves the ball in wider areas, United can spring a press trap.
Ok. Great plan. Why doesn’t it work? The first reason, and one that Amorim is not wholly guilty of, is individual errors. United has one of the worst xG records against it. As we saw on opening day, against Arsenal, United is vulnerable in set-piece scenarios. Ultimately, against faster attackers, players like Luke Shaw have struggled to cope.
Another reason is that Amorim’s philosophy often leaves the two pivots exposed. Neither combination of players has been exactly ideal. Furthermore, Amorim has shown that he does not trust Kobbie Mainoo, a player seen by the supporters as a great talent.
Ultimately, United still lacks the players to execute this system effectively. Adding youngster Patrick Dorgu finally provided the team with a left wing-back. But other players operating on the wing, generally, have been taken from other positions and brought into this role. This is how Mason Mount and Amad Diallo have ended up playing as right-backs.
Build-up play
Sporting was known as a team that could boss possession, but also create lightning-fast counter-attacks when needed. There wasn’t much room for risky passes.
On the other hand, the 2025/26 Manchester United is one of the teams in the Premier League that plays the most long-range passes.
Apart from Matthijs De Ligt and Luke Shaw, Bruno Fernandes plays the most passes. The Portuguese makes 90% of his short passes. But asked, often, to play as a defensive midfielder, Fernandes is required to try risky long balls. Fernandes makes only 54% of those passes. In fact, other than Mainoo and Casemiro, no United player has a success rate of more than 70% when it comes to long-range passes, which the team attempts more often these days.
However, the direct build-up play has increased the number of goal-scoring opportunities over those of last season. Amorim, surely, believes that it’s only a matter of time before United starts scoring regularly.
Still, this approach leaves some wondering what solutions the team will find against an opposition that sits back and tries to play on the counter-attack. In the humbling defeat to Grimsby Town, Amorim was outdone by a system in which the lower-tier opposition used man-to-man marking and sat back, soaking up pressure.
Manchester United in attack
Amorim used most of his significant transfer budget to reshape Manchester United’s attack. Some fans may decry the loss of Alejandro Garnacho and, especially, Rasmus Hojlund, but the manager was adamant.
Playing behind the attackers, Amorim wanted proven Premier League players. This meant that Joshua Zirkzee had been dropped to the bench. Mattheus Cunha and Bryan Mbuemo have been brought in from lower-level EPL teams. However, both have brought a good degree of intensity to United’s playing style.
Both Cunha and Mbuemo (occasionally replaced by Mason Mount, Diallo or Zirkzee) essentially play as deep central attackers.
For this to work, Amorim wanted a tall target man. Benjamin Sesko was brought in for this purpose. His shots from long range may be an additional factor for using him in the starting line-up.
But what hasn’t worked so far? Amorim would blame it on bad luck. However, the problem’s often been the supply of passes.
Where do the assists come from? Amorim’s preferred method seems to be through crosses from the byline. However, as things stand, Dorgu averages 0.8 crosses inside the box per 90 minutes. Noussair Mazroui provde 0,7 crosses. Dalot averages one cross per game, and Diallo only 0.2
On the other hand, Mbuemo makes 2.1 crosses per game, but most first be fed the right pass to be able to create the goal-scoring opportunity.
Finally, Bruno Fernandes, no longer being a classic playmaker type, can affect United’s attacking potential. So does the fact that Kobbie Mainoo, an excellent passer, no longer gets much playing time.
How Does United Fix Manchester United’s Problems Before It’s Too Late?
Just play Sunderland every week.
But seriously.. United’s squad is not as weak as it is publicly advertised. Amorim is not as naive as an EPL manager as rumoured.
However, Amorim’s style of play, currently, only works against opposition that is willing to attack and incapable of forcing errors from United’s defenders.
If United manages to get better results from its wing-backs, things will improve. It’s unfair, however, to ask the inexperienced Dorgu to take on all these responsibilities.
If United manages to find the right midfield combination, the game will improve.
Additionally, if United can maximise the creative potential of Mason Mount, who’s often been injured, in a central midfield role, things can improve.
So, that’s it! Essentially, United either need better-suited players for this system, or for the manager to adapt the tactics to suit the qualities of the players he does have at his disposal.
Or, perhaps, through endlessly drilling his philosophy, United’s playing will improve. Time will tell, but time may not wait too long for Amorim either.
